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ARGUMENT 
a. Appellant Tammy Demonstrated Genuine Issues of Material Fact Since Entry of the 
Last Order on June 13, 2013, and, Therefore, This Court Should Reverse the District 
Court's Decision Affirming the Magistrate's Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment 
The summary judgment standard is as follows: 
"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court 
utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling 
on the motion." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,804,291 P.3d 1000, 
1003 (2012). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." [Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c). "When 
considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw 
all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party. " Dulaney v. St. 
Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002). "If 
the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of 
law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Lapham v. Stewart, 
137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396,399 (2002). 
Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014). 
As previously indicated, the main reasons Magistrate McDaniel used to justify reducing 
Appellant Tammy's custody and visitation with her son were due to his strong belief that 
everything she said she had in place at the time of the trial, her apartment, her employment and 
even her intent to remain in the state of Idaho, were all a fa9ade that she designed for the sole 
purpose of impressing the court. The following excerpt from Magistrate McDaniel's order 
support's Appellant Tammy's contention. 
[Appellant] Tammy answered her interrogatories in April of 2013 saying 
that she was not employed. However, at the time of the trial she testified 
that her interrogatories were wrong and that she has been employed since 
January, as a substitute teacher however [Appellant] Tammy has presented 
no evidence of that employment (R., Vol. I, p. 45, L. 1-4) 
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[Appellant] Tammy testified that she has no furnishings at her new 
apartment. Therefore both she and [CGK] have to sleep on the floor when 
he visits her (R., Vol. I, p. 46, L. 1-2) 
In the case at bar Tammy, in her counterclaim, alleged that she should 
have primary physical custody of the child  with Jon having every 
other weekend visitation. However, Tammy's wishes do not correspond 
with her actions. Basically Tammy abandoned  to Jon from August 
of 2011, until approximately two weeks before the trial which took place 
in May of 20i3. 
Many times a person's actions speak a lot louder than their words and in 
this case it is clear that Tammy has no intention of having a long term stay 
in Idaho since until just shortly before the trial she was living in a 
homeless shelter with no transportation and according to her own 
interrogatories no employment. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 48, L. 15-23) 
However, magically two weeks before trial she obtained an apartment 
(without any furniture) and obtained a car and is now testifying that she 
has a job and has had a job since January working as a substitute teacher. 
However, Tammy presented no evidence to substantiate this conflict 
between her answers to interrogatories and her testimony. (R., Vol. I, p. 
49, L. 1-4) 
Therefore, the following three substantial and material change in circumstances that 
Appellant Tammy has demonstrated warrant modifying the current custody and visitation order: 
1. Appellant Tammy is gainfully employed full time at Maximus of Boise since 
September 16, 2013. 
2. Appellant Tammy is no longer living in the United Arab Emirates and has resided in 
Idaho since her return on October 31, 2012. 
3. Appellant Tammy has a fully furnished two-bedroom apartment in Meridian, Idaho. 
The lower court agreed that her issues of substantial and material change in circumstances had 
been met. However, Magistrate Ellis determined that it would not be in CGK's best interest to 
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change the current custody and visitation order and denied Appellant Tammy an evidentiary 
hearing. 
The District Court affirmed Magistrate Ellis' decision and even provided additional 
reasons to support his ruling. After weighing the evidence on appeal, Judge Schroeder also 
determined that changing the custody arrangement would not serve CGK's best interest as 
indicated below. 
A review of Magistrate McDaniel's order indicates that there was much more than 
the permanence of Tammy's residence and her employment status involved in the 
decision to award primary physical custody of the child to his father. The more 
stable environment that [CGK] was in with his father, where he was happy and 
thriving at home and at school and where he was near his friends, was a very 
important factor, as was the level of his involvement in [CGK's] life, in addition 
to the disturbing testimony concerning Tammy's demeanor and temperament. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 236, L. 9-15). 
As determined by the magistrate, the facts of full time employment and a more 
stable housing situation by themselves do not meet the threshold showing of a 
material change in circumstances that would make a change in custody status in 
the best interest of the child The facts of housing and employment are not 
disputed. These facts by themselves do not open the door to reopening litigation 
and disturbing the custodial arrangement that was found to be in the child's best 
interest. (R., Vol. I, p. 236, L. 16-21). 
His decision was based on Magistrate McDaniel's findings from June of 2013 rather than 
Appellant Tammy's substantial and material change in circumstances that she has demonstrated 
since then. While not disputing Magistrate McDaniel's order, Appellant Tammy is respectfully 
directing the court to observe the flaws with the lower court's line ofreasoning. 
1. As previously addressed on page seventeen (17) paragraph one (1) of her Appellant's 
Brief, Magistrate McDaniel's Findings and Facts do not show that Respondent Jon is 
able to provide a more stable home. To the contrary, he moved a minimum of five (5) 
times over the past six (6) years and held various part time jobs during that period of 
time. Furthermore, during the near eight (8) year duration that Appellant Tammy 
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spent raising CGK on her own in the state of Texas, Respondent Jon made no 
concerted effort to move closer to him and never contested or attempted to modify the 
custody order. 
2. As evidenced in the record, CGK maintained exemplary grades in school, and he was 
a very happy and well-adjusted little boy, throughout the many years that he spent in 
his mother's care. Indicating that he also thrived when he lived with his mother. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 198-204, R., Vol. I, p. 110-124, 164). 
3. Magistrate McDaniel's order dictates that Appellant Tammy's involvement in her 
son's life will remain unreasonably restricted until a substantial and material change 
in circumstances is affected to allow for a modification. Otherwise, she too would be 
equally involved in his life-just as she was prior to the entry of his order. 
4. While it may have been reported as Findings of Fact, Angela's testimony regarding 
Appellant Tammy's demeanor and temperament is, by definition, her own personal 
opinion combined with a single, highly questionable accusation. As previously stated, 
Appellant Tammy did refute her testimony. In any event, there has been no such 
alleged verbal confrontations since then. 
In addition to the above, Appellant Tammy has demonstrated a substantial and material 
change in circumstances since that time-as confirmed by the lower courts. To reiterate, the 
primary reasons ~1agistrate I\1cDaniel reduced i\ .. ppellant TarP.i.irny's time ,,;ith her son was d11e to 
his strong belief that her unfurnished apartment, her employment and even her residency in 
Idaho was a temporary fa9ade designed to impress the court. He stated this in his Findings of 
Facts, in his Conclusions of Law and in his final order. Magistrate McDaniel wrote: 
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Many times a person's actions speak a lot louder than their words and in this case 
it is clear that Tammy has no intention of having a long term stay in Idaho since 
until just shortly before the trial she was living in a homeless shelter with no 
transportation and according to her own interrogatories no employment. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 48, L. 15-23). 
However, magically two weeks before trial she obtained an apartment (without 
any furniture) and obtained a car and is now testifying that she has a job and has 
had a job since January working as a substitute teacher. However, Tammy 
presented no evidence to substantiate this conflict between her answers to 
interrogatories and her testimony. (R., Vol. I, p. 49, L. 1-4). 
Child Custody: The parties shall be awarded joint legal and physical custody 
of the minor child, [CGK],  The Father, Jon Klein, shall be 
awarded primary physical custod f the parties' minor child. If and when 
Mother, Tammy Moore, obtains a bed for [CGK], Mother's visitation shall be as 
follows: (R., Vol. I, p. 57, L. 2-5). 
In reference to the above mentioned citation, a reasonable person would agree that if 
Magistrate McDaniel did believe she was going to get a bed for CGK, the language he used 
would have reflected his certainty. He would have written something to the effect of, visitation 
shall commence as soon as Appellant Tammy obtains a bed for CGK to convey his belief. 
Instead he wrote, if and when ... [Appellant] Tammy ... obtains a bed for [CGK]. 
Magistrate McDaniel's apparent disbelief in Appellant Tammy's intent to stay in Idaho 
along with her alleged, unfurnished apartment, built the foundation that supported his decision to 
drastically reduce Appellant Tammy's time with CGK. Without that, he would have had no 
sound reason for radically reducing her time with CGK. She did nothing wrong. Appellant 
Tammy has met the threshold showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances, 
and the magistrate erred in granting Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the moving party. 
b. The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion and the District Court Erred in Affirming 
the Magistrate's Denial of Appellant Tammy's Motion For Leave To Amend Petition 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 5 
Despite the Magistrate's own admission that he was denying her Motion For Leave To 
Amend Petition primarily on the timing, Respondent Jon argues that is incorrect. Instead, he 
argues, it was due to his contention that Appellant Tammy was only filing her Leave for 
Amend Petition to subvert a summary judgment motion. 
I'm going to deny that motion primarily on the timing. We had a review hearing in 
this matter some time ago, specifically it was on August 251h, 2014. At that time 
Ms. Silva made it clear that she was-well, she made her formal motion for-to 
dismiss or motion for summary judgment and made it clear what her basis was. 
Ms. Silva then followed up that motion with her memorandum and affidavit in 
support of that motion on September 51\ 2014. And Ms. Moore, when you 
received that, I think you became aware specifically of what Ms. Silva on behalf 
of Mr. Klein was alleging or arguing. And it was at that time that you filed your 
motion-you filed simultaneously a memo in opposition to that-plus a leave to 
amend your petition. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 12, L. 17-25, p. 13, L. 1-6) 
The court system would kind of grind to a halt if every time one party filed a 
motion or filed their memorandum or supplied their briefing and said Here is why 
we believe the other parties motion is improper, if the other party could then say, 
Oh, I see what they're arguing, I'm going to amend my petition to correct that-
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 13, L. 12-18). 
And this close to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I don't think it's 
proper to allow you to amend your petition. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 14, L. 1-3) 
Significant to mention, Magistrate Ellis' statement, And this close to a ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment ... suggests that he had already decided to dismiss Appellant Tammy's 
Motion to Modify an Order or Decree before the hearing was even held. In addition, he fails 
to acknowledge that the hearing held on October 10, 2014 was supposed to be for Appellant 
Tammy's Motion to Modify an Order or Decree, along with Respondent Jon's Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Appellant Tammy filed her motion on the advice of her attorney, Ann Shepherd. Her 
attorney pointed out to her that she failed to indicate a change in annual income on her 
Motion to Modify an Order or Decree. Therefore, she needed to make an amendment to her 
motion so the magistrate could accurately calculate child support. This, however, was not a 
tactic used to subvert a summary judgment motion. It was necessary to include it in the 
record. 
Appellant Tammy filed her Motion for Leave to Amend Petition on September 8, 2014. 
Respondent Jon filed a Second Affidavit In Support of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on October 3, 2014. (R., Vol. I, p. 7). The 
actual hearing wherein Magistrate Ellis granted Respondent Jon's request for Summary 
Judgment was held on October 10, 2014. (R., Vol. I, p. 8). At said hearing, he did not dismiss 
or question Respondent Jon's Second Affidavit In Support of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss 
or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment-so close to his ruling on motion for 
summary judgment. Additionally, Appellant Tammy's Motion to Modify an Order or Decree 
was to be heard at the hearing held on October 10, 2014, as well. Magistrate Ellis abused his 
discretion in denying Appellant Tammy's Motion for leave to Amend Petition. 
The standard for review of abuse of discretion is as follows: 
"' The grant or denial of leave to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is a 
matter that is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on 
appeal only for an abuse of that discretion. The test for whether a trial court has 
abused its discretion is three-fold: 
( 1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. '" 
DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company, 156 Idaho 749,755,331 P.3d 
491,497 (2014). 
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c. Magistrate Ellis Abused His Discretion in Awarding Child Support Modification 
Effective Upon Entry of His Order, Beginning November 2014 Instead Setting a 
Retroactive Date 
Respondent Jon argues that because Appellant Tammy did not cite an authority that 
specifically addresses the abuse of discretion standard in support of this specific argument, 
her appeal on this issue in invalid. However, Respondent Jon does acknowledge that 
Appellant Tammy did cite to a statute and the transcript but not in support of her argument, 
only as background. (Respondent's Brief at 17). The following citations were included in 
Appellant Tammy's brief in support of her argument in favor of setting a retroactive date. 
Idaho Code § 32-709 provides courts with discretion to retroactively modify child 
support as to installments accruing after filing of the motion for modification so 
long as the moving party shows a substantial and material change of 
circumstances has occurred since the last order. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 142, 
911, P2d 133, 138 (1996). 
Appellant Tammy did affect a substantial and material change of circumstances as 
evidenced and confirmed by Magistrate Ellis at the hearing on her Motion to Modify an Order or 
Decree. 
I do conclude, however, because this is granted in part, denied in part-
I've denied the custodial-I do conclude that your full-time employment, 
Ms. Moore, is a substantial material change since the entry of the June 13, 
2013 order. And that does warrant modification of the child support 
ohl1crnt1on (Tr Vol T n T) T 1'L17\ 
'-JIJ.l.l.f,1,..4-\.-.1.'-J.l..l. \ .L .lo' Y '-/.lo -"", _t-'• "-"-, J.....Jo .1. "- .l I j 
( l) The provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may 
be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the 
modification and only upon a showing of a substantial and material 
change of circumstances. (I.C. § 32-709) 
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As Appellant Tammy previously indicated, she did not request the magistrate court to 
enter her child support retroactive because she understood common practice was to enter child 
support modification effective the day the motion was submitted and filed with the clerk of the 
court-barring extraordinary circumstances. And so, she did not deem it necessary to ask. 
d. The District Court Eired in Affirming 1\1agistrate Ellis' Decision to Deny ~t\.ppellant 
Tammy's Request to Omit or Modify the Cost of Health Insurance 
Respondent Jon argues that Appellant Tammy failed to include her request to omit or modify 
the cost of health insurance in her original Motion to Modify an Order or Decree. Therefore, her 
argument is invalid. 
Respondent Jon's argument is without merit. He failed to raise his objection to her issue on 
appeal at the time it was being heard by the trial court. 
Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider an alleged error on appeal 
unless a timely objection to the alleged error was made at trial. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961,976 (2010); I.RE. 103(a)(l). For an objection to be 
preserved for appellate review, "either the specific ground for the objection must 
be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context." 
Slack, 140 Idaho at 921, 104 P.3d t 963; I.R.E. 103(a)(l). 
With that said, Appellant Tammy had no way of pre-determining, foreseeing, what 
Magistrate Ellis was going to award to either party. Therefore, she did not include a request to 
omit or modify health insurance in her Motion to Modify an Order or Decree, dated April 16, 
2014. She did, however, raise the issue of addressing Respondent Jon's lack of refusal to comply 
to Idaho Code § 32-717(8)(3) at the time it was being heard by the trial court, as evidenced 
below. 
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Also the insurance that Jon is purchasing for [CGK] at $164 a month, had he 
consulted me, which I believe it is his responsibility to do, that insurance would 
have been considerably less. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 36, L. 23-25, p. 37, L. 1) 
And I actually have a better insurance policy through my employer which 
includes dental...(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 37, L. 2-3) 
Her request was dismissed as follows: 
I don't have any objection to giving you a little bit more time. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 3 7, 
L. 8-9) What I don't see myself having the authority to do is to require you or Mr. 
Klein to engage in a negotiation about the insurance. At the end of the day, ifhe 
has insurance, this is the number that is being submitted to me. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 37, 
L. 11-15) I can't require him and you to agree on a cheaper insurance. (Tr., Vol. 
2, p. 37, L. 17-18) 
e. The District Court Erred in Affirming the Magistrate Court's Decision to Deny 
Appellant Tammy's Motion and Affidavit for a Fee Waiver 
Respondent Jon argues that the district court's decision affirming Magistrate Ellis denial 
of fee waiver was appropriate because he provided a reason for denying her request. His 
argument does not withstand scrutiny and, therefore, the decision to deny Appellant 
Tammy's request for fee waiver was in err. 
According to Idaho Code§ 3 l-3220(1)(d), "Indigent" means a person who is not a 
prisoner, as defined in section 31-3220A, Idaho Code, and who is found by the court to be 
unable to pay fees, costs or security in a civil action. In addition to the request for fee waiver, 
the recipient must also include a sworn Affidavit verifying the following items for 
- - -
consideration: 
(a) The person's identity; 
(b) The nature and amount of his income; 
(c) His spouse's income; 
(d) The real and personal property owned; 
( e) His cash or checking accounts; 
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( f) His dependents; 
(g) His debts; 
(h) His monthly expenses; 
(i) The nature of the action; 
(i) The affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress. 
To state that Appellant Tammy did not meet the requirements based on Idaho Code § 31-
3 220( 1 )( d) is vague and unclear. Reviewing the income to debt information required for 
eligibility, which of the numerous above-listed items did Appellant Tammy fail to meet? And 
why? 
f. Respondent Jon Should Not Be Awarded Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal 
Respondent Jon argues that Appellant Tammy's case is frivolous and is nothing more 
than an attempt to re-litigate the case tried before Judge McDaniel. Therefore, he should be 
awarded attorney fees and costs. Appellant Tammy disagrees. 
An award of attorney fees may be granted by the district court, when acting in its 
appellate capacity, under LC.§ 12-121 and LA.R. 41. Rendon v. Paskett, 126 
Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct.App.1995). Such an award is permissible 
only if the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Id. An award under 
LC.§ 12-121 may not be made where the appeal presents a genuine issue of law 
for review. Giilingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Co., 106 Idaho 859, 863, 
683 P.2d 895,899 (Ct.App.1984). 
As previously indicated, Appellant Tammy is not re-litigating Magistrate McDaniel's 
Order dated June 13, 2013. However, the lower courts are relying largely on his Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, rather than the substantial and material change in circumstances that 
she has demonstrated since that time, to support their decision to grant a partial summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent Jon. Therefore, in her appeal, Appellant Tammy specifically 
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addresses and argues the reason(s) given by the lower courts for dismissing her motion to modify 
custody, which requires a thorough review if Magistrate McDaniel's order. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District Court's decision affirming the Magistrate Court's 
Orders. Due process has not been served, and Appellant Tammy is requesting the 
aforementioned decisions on appeal to be reversed and remanded to the trial court for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this fr"'-day of December, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-Ji. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ff day of December, 2015, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing 
the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Thomas Humphrey 
P.O. Box 223 
Boise, Idaho, 83701 
tom@humphreylawidaho.com 
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){__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
%_Email 
ro Se, Appellant 
